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Washington's Partial Veto Power: Judicial
Construction of Article III, Section 12
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of the governor to veto' legislation is a legisla-
tive power.2 Article III, section 12 of the Washington Constitu-tion grants the governor the power to veto not only entire bills,but parts of bills.' In this respect, Washington is like mostother states.4 However, the provisions of article III, section 12,both before and after amendment in 1974,' go beyond those ofother states6 by allowing the governor to partially veto billsthat are not appropriation bills, subject to an override by two-
thirds of the legislature.7
The effect of article III, section 12 is to allow the governor,with certain limitations, to legislate with only one-third of thevotes in the legislature.8 Thus, any judicial interpretation ofthe language in article III, section 12 can greatly alter the gov-ernor's power to legislate. Although the situation calls for
1. "Veto" means "I forbid." R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 140 (1935). See alsoBeckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 TEMp. L.Q. 27 (1957) (As generallyused in the United States, the term includes both the refusal of the executive officerwhose approval is necessary to perfect a law that has been passed by the legislativebody and the message which is usually sent to the legislature stating the reasons forthe lack of the executive's approval.) [hereinafter Beckman].
2. "In approving or disapproving legislation, the Governor acts in a legislativecapacity and as part of the legislative branch of government." Hallin v. Trent, 94Wash. 2d 671, 677, 619 P.2d 357, 360 (1980). The President's powers are analogous. In1959, President Eisenhower stated, "I am part of the legislative process." R.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1961), cited in State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82Wis. 2d 679, 709-711, 264 N.W.2d 39, 552-53 n.3 (1978).
3. See text, part II.
4. See Beckman, supra note 1, at 27.5. 1974 WASH. LAWS, 1st Ex. Sess., 806-07, S.J.Res. No. 140, approved Nov. 5, 1974.6. T. BURKE & M. MALNATI, REPORT ON THE PARTIAL VETO POWER AND THE1985 PARTIAL VETOES, 47-48 (Office of Program Research 1985) [hereinafter BURKE &
MALNATI].
7. See infra notes 12 and 16.
8. See Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 551, 682P.2d 869, 877 (1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
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judicial restraint, the Washington Supreme Court has not,
until recently, shown an inclination to carefully interpret the
language of article III, section 12. The court has used two dif-
ferent subjective tests to determine the constitutional validity
of partial vetoes. Both tests created uncertainty in the legisla-
tive process and produced confusing results. In 1984, the court
abandoned the affirmative-negative test,9 and the court may
soon have a chance to abandon the separate subject test1° for
section vetoes.
This Note recommends that the separate subject test be
abandoned like the affirmative-negative test before it. In the
alternative, the Constitution should be amended to remove any
perceived need for a subjective judicial test. As a last-choice
solution to the problem of uncertainty and inefficiency in the
legislative process, the legislature should use its override pow-
ers more extensively.
II. ARTICLE III, SECTION 12 AND THE 62ND AMENDMENT
Since 1889, when Washington's Constitution went into
effect, the governor has had the authority to veto any entire
bill passed by the legislature.'1 The framers also provided the
legislature with the power to override the governor's veto.
12
Provisions for a gubernatorial veto of whole bills and a legisla-
tive override are standard in state constitutions. What distin-
guishes the Washington Constitution from other state
constitutions, from 1889 to the present, is the provision in arti-
cle III, section 12 allowing the governor to veto portions of
non-appropriation bills. Most states only allow their governor
to veto "parts" or "items" of appropriation bills. Before its
amendment in 1974, article III, section 12 provided in part:
9. Id. at 547, 682 P.2d at 875.
10. See infra part III, B.
11. Article III, section 12 provides in part:
Every act which shall have passed the legislature shall be, before it becomes a
law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall sign it; but if not, he
shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have
originated, which house shall enter the objections at large upon the journal
and proceed to reconsider.
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
12. Article III, section 12 provides in part:
If after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present shall agree to
pass the bill it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
the members present, it shall become a law ....
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
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If any bill presented to the governor contain several sections
or items, he may object to one or more sections or items
while approving other portions of the bill. In such a case heshall append to the bill, at the time of signing it, a statement
of the section, or sections; item or items to which he objects
and the reasons therefor, and the section or sections, item or
items so objected to, shall not take effect unless passed over
the governor's objection, as hereinbefore provided.
This partial veto provision gave the governor tremendous
legislative power by enabling the governor to substantially
alter legislation. In the early 1970's, legislators voiced their
objections to the scope of the governor's partial veto power. 3In 1974, a staff member of the Washington House of Repre-sentatives recommended an amendment to article III, section
12 that would have eliminated the section veto power alto-
gether and further, would have restricted the item veto powerto appropriation items.14 Such an amendment would havegiven Washington's governor the same partial veto power as
most other states allow.15
Instead of the proposed amendment, the voters, in 1974,
approved Senate Joint Resolution No. 140, which became the62nd amendment. The amendment did not eliminate the sec-
tion veto, but it restricted the section veto to "entire" sections.
In addition, the amendment restricted item vetoes to "appro-priation" items. The partial veto portion of article III, section
12 as amended provides:
If any bill presented to the governor contain several sectionsor appropriation items, he may object to one or more sec-tions or appropriation items while approving other portionsof the bill: Provided, That he may not object to less than anentire section, except that if the section contains one ormore appropriation items he may object to any such appro-
priation item or items.
The third change made by the 62nd amendment was togive the legislature additional override powers. If the governor
vetoes a bill or any part of one after the legislature adjourns,
the 62nd amendment authorizes the legislature to reconvene in
an extraordinary session within forty-five days after adjourn-
13. See infra note 14.
14. Burke, The Partial Veto Power: Legislation by the Governor, 49 WASH. L. REV.
603, 613-14 (1974) [hereinafter Burke, The Partial Veto Power].
15. Id. at 604 n.3.
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ment to reconsider any vetoes.' 6
Both before and after the 1974 amendment, the extent of
the governor's partial veto powers under article III, section 12
has repeatedly caused concern, especially among state legisla-
tors, that the Washington governor has too much legislative
power. Even Washington governors have recognized possible
problems with the veto provision. In 1917, Governor Ernest
Lister wrote in a letter:
I feel that this provision is wise, in that it enables the Gover-
nor to hold a strong check on legislation .... I have often
felt that the power could be broadened to good advantage,
giving the Governor power to veto portions of a section or to
reduce appropriation items. It is possible, however, that so
doing would be to place too much power in the hands of the
Chief Executive.17
Interpretations by the Washington Supreme Court of the
words in article III, section 12 necessarily affect the balance of
power between the legislature and the governor. Knowing
this, the court has a duty to discern the intent embodied in the
language and to make decisions accordingly. For the court to
make decisions based on how it thinks the legislative power
ought to be allocated is judicial policymaking. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court has not always recognized this distinction,
but its recent abandonment of the affirmative-negative test
indicates that the court has reassessed its role in partial veto
cases.
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PARTIAL VETO POWER
Court challenges to specific partial vetoes began as early as
191018 and continue to occur today.19  The Washington
Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality of partial
vetoes both in terms of the express restraints in the constitu-
16. Amendment 62 provides in part:
Provided, That within forty-five days next after adjournment, Sundays
excepted, the legislature may, upon petition by a two-thirds majority or more
of the membership of each house, reconvene in extraordinary session, not to
exceed five days duration, solely to reconsider any bills vetoed.
WASH. CONST. amend. 62.
17. R. LUCE, supra note 1, at 189.
18. Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910). See
infra note 21.
19. See discussion of Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, No. 85-2-
01488-7 (Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1987) infra notes 87-95 and
accompanying text.
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tion and in terms of restraints the court found to be necessar-
ily implied. The tests developed by the court have been
difficult to apply. Further, they have not enhanced predictabil-
ity or efficiency in the legislative process. Changes in the par-
tial veto power found in the express language of the 62nd
amendment eliminate the need for semantic tests of validity, at
least for the section veto power.2 ° One such test, the affirma-
tive-negative test, has recently been abolished. The court
should do the same with its separate subject test for determin-
ing what a "section" is.
A. The Affirmative-Negative Test
1. Historical Background
Later cases credit Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker"
with establishing the affirmative-negative test in Washington.
Under this test, the governor may only exercise the partial
20. The scope of the governor's power to veto "appropriation items" has not been
tested in court. An appropriation item could be considered strictly a dollar amount, on
the one hand, or the term could be broadly construed to include conditions or
restrictions on the monetary item. In many jurisdictions, a governor with the power to
veto appropriation items may not veto conditions to, or restrictions on, the
appropriation without vetoing the appropriation itself. See, e.g., State ex rel. Link v.
Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 271 (N.D. 1979). Contra Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 715, 264 N.W.2d
at 555. Governor Gardner seems to have given the term an expansive interpretation;
in the 1985 Legislative Session he repeatedly vetoed conditions on appropriations.
BURKE & MALNATI, supra note 6, at 13-37.
21. 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910). Although the case is cited as authority for the
affirmative-negative test, the court considered the effect of the veto a nullity on other
constitutional grounds. In March, 1909, the legislature passed a materialmen's lien
statute. At a later session in 1909 the legislature passed another materialmen's lien
bill. Section 5 of the later act repealed the March act, and section 6 declared an
emergency. The first four sections of the later act contained the body of the
materialmen's lien requirements. The governor repealed all but the repealing and
emergency sections, sections 5 and 6, leaving only a repealing act. The court held the
remaining repealing law unconstitutional because the nature of the act was not
expressed in the title, as required by Washington Constitution article II, § 19. See
infra note 90. In discussing the governor's actions the court said:
The repealing clause was a mere incident to the affirmative legislation
contained in the act, and when the latter fell under the veto the former fell
with it. In other words, when the executive approved the repealing section he
approved something that his veto had already destroyed. The legislature
attempted to substitute one act for another and the executive had a right to
place his veto on the substitution, but he could not defeat the one act by his
veto, and the other by approving the repealing clause.
Id at 86, 109 P. at 320. These words have been interpreted by members of the court to
mean that the governor cannot use the veto power to legislate affirmatively. See State
ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wash. 2d 554, 558, 348 P.2d 971, 973-74 (1960)(Finley, J.,
dissenting).
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veto power in a negative or destructive manner. The power
may not be used in an affirmative or creative way.22 In other
words, the power should be used to prevent some provision
from becoming law, but not to add a new or different result
from what the legislature intended.23
This test has been applied in several states and is based on
notions of separation of powers.24 Courts using the test often
reason that because all affirmative power to legislate is granted
to the legislature, what remains for the governor is only the
power to delete or destroy. The governor does not have the
power to change the legislature's intent.25
Washington courts have produced confusing results when
applying the affirmative-negative test to partial veto disputes.
Members of the Washington Supreme Court, moreover, have
quite often disagreed among themselves on whether a partial
veto was an "affirmative" or "negative" exercise of the partial
veto power.
For example, in Cascade Telephone Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion 26 a split court in 1934 upheld the partial veto of an excise
tax bill covering business activities. The vetoed portion
allowed certain classes of taxed businesses, such as telephone
companies, to pass the tax burden on to the ultimate con-
sumer. Without the vetoed portion of the legislation, these
companies could not reimburse themselves for the tax paid."
According to the majority of the court, "[t]he Governor's act in
vetoing this separable item, or section, was purely negative. 28
Justice Steinert, along with another dissenting judge, found
the exercise of the partial veto power in this instance "affirma-
tive, because it actually [created] a result different from that
intended, and arrived at, by the Legislature." 29
The court next considered the partial veto power in 1960
22. Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wash. 2d 563, 565-66, 564
P.2d 788, 791 (1977).
23. Id.
24. Harrington, The Propriety of the Negative-The Governor's Partial Veto
Authority, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 865, 869 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 24, at 869-73; Comment, Where's the Pork?
Restoring Balance With A Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
259, 273 (1985).
26. 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934).
27. Id. at 619-20, 30 P.2d at 977-78.
28. Id. at 620, 30 P.2d at 978.
29. Id. at 623, 30 P.2d at 979.
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in State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini ° That case arose from the
governor's veto of a salary increase for himself. Governor
Rosellini approved the remainder of the bill, which raised the
salaries of other elected officials. The majority upheld the veto
as a valid exercise of the governor's power to veto items3 '
under article III, section 12, but did not discuss the affirmative-
negative test. Justice Finley, however, argued in dissent that
the veto was an invalid affirmative legislative action by the
governor because the governor used the veto to fix his own sal-
ary instead of accepting the salary designated by the
legislature.2
Later, a unanimous court in Washington Association of
Apartment Associations v. Evans33 held invalid a series of
vetoes to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973.' The
court considered affirmative all but one35 of fourteen partial
vetoes in eleven different sections of the Act. The effect of all
the partial vetoes was to grant tenants more protection than
the legislature had provided. For example, in one part of the
Act, the governor vetoed a provision requiring that the tenant
be current in the payment of all utilities the tenant had agreed
to pay before the tenant could pursue any of the remedies
under the Act. Without this provision, the tenant would only
need to be current in rental payments.3 6
In 1980, the court decided the last case under the affirma-
tive-negative test. Hallin v. Trent 37 concerned legislation cre-
ating new judicial positions for three counties. One section of
the bill required that the judgeships be filled by general elec-
tion. Without this section, judicial positions would be filled
by gubernatorial appointment. The court upheld the gover-
nor's veto of this section, finding that "the veto was used
destructively without affecting the basic legislation," because
"the principal objective of the legislation was the providing of
30. 55 Wash. 2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960).
31. Id. at 556, 348 P.2d at 973. See infra note 62.
32. Id at 561-62, 348 P.2d at 975.
33. 88 Wash. 2d 563, 564 P.2d 788 (1977).
34. See infra note 71.
35. The court found the other attempted partial veto invalid because it was not
"severable" and only part of a single subject. Therefore, it was not an "item" that
could be vetoed under WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12. 88 Wash. 2d at 569, 564 P.2d at 792.
36. Id at 567-68, 564 P.2d at 792.
37. 94 Wash. 2d 671, 619 P.2d 357 (1980).
38. 1979 WASH. LAWS 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 202, § 6.
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new judicial positions for various counties. '3 9 The veto did not
change the legislature's intent to create new judgeships.
2. Washington Federation of State Employees
v. State of Washington
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court was again asked
to invalidate a partial veto based on the affirmative-negative
test. This time it declined to do so. The court abandoned the
affirmative-negative test and upheld the governor's actions as a
valid veto of an entire section.40
The case concerned a bill that amended the state civil ser-
vice laws to permit the state to consider not only seniority, but
also performance in decisions on salaries, layoffs, and reem-
ployment. The governor approved the bill except for section
30 and all references to that section. Section 30, a legislative
veto provision, mandated legislative review of all administra-
tive rules implementing the Act. By vetoing section 30, the
governor removed from the legislative branch the final say in
implementing the Act.4 '
The Washington Federation of State Employees, AFL-
CIO, challenged the governor's veto' of section 30 and the ref-
erences to it. The union alleged, first, that the veto was pro-
hibited under article III, section 12 as an item veto43 and,
second, that the veto was void as an "affirmative" veto.4 4 After
rejecting the union's challenge to the amendments as a
whole,4 5 the court discussed the veto issue.
First, the court dismissed the union's item veto contention,
39. Hallin, 94 Wash. 2d at 678, 619 P.2d at 360.
40. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 544, 682 P.2d
869, 875 (1984).
41. Id. at 551, 682 P.2d at 877 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
42. The union also challenged the amendments as a violation of Washington's
contract clause. Washington Constitution article I, § 13 provides: "No bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed."
According to the union, established practices under existing personnel laws gave rise
to contractual expectancies on the part of state civil service employees, and the
amendments would impair those contractual rights. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d
at 538-39, 682 P.2d at 871. The court rejected the union's contract argument: "The
rights challenged here are neither deferred benefits [as compared to pension laws] nor
do they give rise to contractual expectancies. Rather, the affected provisions . . . are
best categorized as terms of public employment (tenure) and part of a system of
personnel administration. Cf. RCW 41.06.010; RCW 28B.16.010. Tenure is regulated by
legislative policy." Id. at 542, 682 P.2d at 872.
43. Id. at 542, 682 P.2d at 872.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 42.
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noting that the code revisor would have taken out the refer-
ences to section 30 if the governor had not done so himself,
because without section 30 in the act, the references to that
section would have been "manifestly obsolete. '46 Thus, the
governor's removal of these references was purely a "ministe-
rial act."47
Second, the court considered whether the veto of section
30 was affirmative. After reviewing its history of applying the
affirmative-negative test, the court declared, "[W]e believe the
affirmative-negative veto concept has outlived its usefulness. '"48
The court noted that the test was subjective and unworkable.49
No one could predict whether any given partial veto would be
upheld or struck down. 0 Adopting the views of one member
of the Wisconsin court in State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta,5' the
court observed that "'[elvery veto may be perceived in affirma-
tive or negative terms, and as either conforming to or defying
the general legislative intent, depending on the observer's per-
spective.' "52 This observation was particularly appropriate in
Washington Federation because the justices did not agree on
whether the veto in question was affirmative or negative. The
majority of the court considered the veto of section 30 a nega-
tive veto.53 Three dissenting justices found the governor's veto"clearly affirmative in nature."'
The court found that, in addition to promoting uncer-
tainty, the affirmative-negative test also involved the court in
the legislative process. The test forced the court to decide
cases based on its assessment of the different policies of the
legislature and the governor.55 As the court explained, using
the affirmative-negative test "is an intrusion into the legisla-
tive branch, contrary to the separation of powers doctrine, and
substitutes judicial judgment for the judgment of the legisla-
46. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 544, 682 P.2d at 873-74.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 546, 682 P.2d at 874.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
52. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 546, 682 P.2d at 875 (quoting Kleczka, 82
Wis. 2d at 721, 264 N.W.2d at 557-58).
53. Id. at 546, 682 P.2d at 874.
54. Id. at 551, 682 P.2d at 877 (Rosellini, J., dissenting, joined by Dore, J., and
Williams, C.J.).
55. Id. at 546, 682 P.2d at 874.
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tive branch. 5 6
The court correctly abandoned the affirmative-negative
test. Before its amendment in 1974, article III, section 12
allowed the governor to veto any "section" or "item" in a bill. 7
That the veto could only be a "negative" veto was nowhere
expressed. By inferring such a requirement, the court not only
inhibited the efficiency of the legislative process by throwing
the validity of partial vetoes into doubt, but it also altered the
relative balance of power in the legislative process between the
legislative and executive branches.
Before the 62nd amendment, the court apparently thought
the governor's powers were so extensive as to require restric-
tion. The 62nd amendment tipped the constitutional balance of
power back in the direction of the legislature by limiting the
item veto to appropriation items, by limiting section vetoes to
"entire sections," and by granting the legislature the power to
reconvene to consider overriding vetoes.58 These changes
influenced the court in Washington Federation to abandon the
affirmative-negative test:
As the defendants note, the test perhaps was needed prior to
adoption of amendment 62 when the item veto was not lim-
ited to appropriations and the Legislature did not have the
authority to call itself back into session to reconsider vetoes.
With the changes adopted in amendment 62, its use is no
longer appropriate.5 9
The court is correct in concluding that to use the affirma-
tive-negative test under the 62nd amendment is inappropriate.
However, the court is incorrect to think that the test was ever
appropriate. If the governor's partial veto powers under article
III, section 12 were too extensive before the 62nd amendment,
then what the people needed was not a subjective judicial test,
but a constitutional amendment. By using the affirmative-neg-
ative test, the court, in effect, amended the Constitution itself,
instead of waiting for Washington voters to make the needed
changes to the Constitution.
Just as the court today should allow the governor to veto
any entire section or appropriation item in a bill, the court
before 1974 should have allowed the governor to veto any sec-
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. See supra part II.
58. See supra note 16.
59. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 547, 682 P.2d at 875 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 10:699
Washington's Partial Veto Power
tion or item in a bill. The Constitution allowed the governor
this power, and the court's duty did not extend to saying thatthe constitutional power granted was too extensive.60 As thecourt in Washington Federation noted when discussing the
veto and override provisions of article III, section 12, "these
constitutional arrangements are for the people to determine,
not this court. If these arrangements become unsatisfactory or
subjected to abuse, the people are capable of making desired
changes."61
The abandonment of the affirmative-negative test in
Washington Federation indicates that the Washington
Supreme Court may now be willing to let the language of arti-cle III, section 12 speak for itself. If this is a trend, it is a good
one, but there is more work to be done. The court needs to re-
evaluate its role in determining the validity of "section" vetoes.
B. The Section Veto
Without the affirmative-negative test, the Washington
Supreme Court is likely to focus more closely on the words"sections" and "items" when the court considers challenges topartial vetoes. Before 1974, the court refused to construe
"item" to mean strictly items in appropriation bills.6 2 The
scope of the governor's power under the 62nd amendment toveto appropriation items has not yet been litigated. Unlike the
item veto, the section veto has received a fair amount of atten-
tion and is currently the subject of litigation. 3
1. Origin of the Separate Subject Test
In 1934, the Washington Supreme Court first interpreted
the word "section" under article III, section 12 in Cascade Tele-
phone Co. v. Tax Commission.' The challenged partial veto
60. The wisdom of constitutional provisions is not subject to judicial review.
Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wash. 2d 189, 196, 543 P.2d 229, 233 (1975).
61. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 547, 682 P.2d at 875.
62. State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wash. 2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960). The
"item" in question was the governor's salary, which was a monetary item, but not an
appropriation item. In response to the argument that "item" as used in the
Constitution meant an appropriation item, the court said, "[w]e find no merit in the
contention that only an item in an appropriation bill is within the purview of the
Constitutional provision." Id. at 556, 348 P.2d at 973. The court, however, left unclear
whether "item" could mean any word or phrase, or just monetary provisions and
appropriations. Burke, The Partial Veto Power, supra note 14, at 606.
63. See supra note 19.
64. 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934).
1987]
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was of an entire numbered section65 of a bill. Though the
court had no reason to discuss whether a constitutional "sec-
tion" could be less than an entire numbered section of a bill, it
nonetheless decided that a "section" under article III, section
12 was not restricted to legislative designation.66 Instead, the
focus was on subject matter. The court held that the constitu-
tional definition of "section" was any portion of a bill with sep-
arate, distinct, and independent subject matter.67
The court feared that if it left defining "section" for par-
tial veto purposes to the legislature, "the Governor's power
might be unduly limited or enlarged without reason" through
"the artful arrangement of subject-matter and an arbitrary
division into sections.'"68 The court's fear that the legislature
could strong-arm the governor was unfounded. The governor
could respond to any "artful" legislative arrangements not
only by vetoing the entire bill, but, unlike any governor in any
other state, by vetoing any numbered section of the bill in
which the legislature included material offensive to the
governor.
Although the court claimed to be giving the word "sec-
tion" its "fair and ordinary"6 9 meaning by defining it in terms
of subject matter, the court failed to consider the word in its
context. Article III, section 12 speaks of sections of bills, not
sections in the abstract. The fair and ordinary meaning of"sections of bills" would be the legislatively-numbered
sections.
The next case to apply the Cascade "separate subject mat-
ter" definition of "section" was Washington Association of
Apartment Associations v. Evans,70 in which the court struck
down the veto of a clause (italicized in the paragraph below) in
the middle of a section of the Residential Landlord-Tenant
Act:
Whenever the landlord learns of a breach of section 13 of
this 1973 amendatory act or has accepted performance by the
tenant which is at variance with the terms of the rental
agreement or rules enforceable after the commencement of
the tenancy, he may immediately give notice to the tenant to
65. The section was numbered "2 1/2." Id. at 618, 30 P.2d at 977.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 620, 30 P.2d at 977.
68. Id. at 619, 30 P.2d at 977.
69. Id.
70. 88 Wash. 2d 563, 564 P.2d 788 (1977).
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remedy the nonconformance. Said notice shall expire after
sixty days unless the landlord pursues any remedy under
this act.7 '
The court considered the whole section to deal with only one
subject matter, the right of the landlord to require conform-
ance by the tenant to the rental agreement.7 2 Thus, the clause
was not severable and could not be vetoed separately.
No section vetoes were challenged after Washington Asso-
ciation until after passage of the 62nd amendment, when the
voters restricted the governor's section veto to "entire" sec-
tions. Surprisingly, the court's determination of the scope of
the section veto power remained the same.
2. "Entire Section"
In Fain v. Chapman7 3 the court had its first opportunity to
apply a new approach to section vetoes. The facts of Fain were
almost identical to those in Hallin v. Trent.74 Both cases con-
cerned legislation that created new judicial positions, and both
required that the new positions be filled by the electoral pro-
cess. In Hallin, the legislature had placed this requirement in a
separately numbered section, and the court upheld the veto of
that section.75 In Fain, the legislature had placed the require-
ment in a proviso to the section creating the new positions.76
In upholding the veto of the election requirement in Fain,
the court noted the new language of the 62nd amendment per-
taining to the section veto power,7 7 but then proceeded to re-
adopt the Cascade separate subject matter test to determine
the validity of a section veto.7 8 Emphasizing that what consti-
tutes a section is a question of law, the court stated that judi-
cial deference to legislative section divisions was not
71. 1973 WASH. LAws, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, § 19 (codified in WASH. REV. CODE
59.18).
72. Washington Ass'n, 88 Wash. 2d at 568-69, 564 P.2d at 792. The court spoke of
the clause as both the "vetoed section" and an "item," but applied the Cascade separate
subject rule for section vetoes. See note 67 and accompanying text.
73. 94 Wash. 2d 684, 619 P.2d 353 (1980).
74. 94 Wash. 2d 671, 619 P.2d 357 (1980). See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
75. Id. at 678, 619 P.2d at 360-61.
76. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 687, 619 P.2d at 355.
77. "Provided, That he may not object to less than an entire section." WASH.
CONST. art. III, § 12 (amend. 62), cited in Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 687, 619 P.2d at 355.
78. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 688, 619 P.2d at 355.
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inevitable. 9
The court also pointed out that the vetoed portion had no
effect on the basic thrust of the legislation providing for new
judicial positions.8 0  This focus on "basic thrust" requires the
same kind of examination as the affirmative-negative test.
Essentially, one would look to see if the intent of the legisla-
ture had been altered.8 ' After Washington Federation, a basic
thrust analysis is of questionable validity.
Without a doubt, interpretation of the Constitution is the
province of the court. However, the court's first task in inter-
preting the provisions of the Constitution is to determine the
intent of the language. 2 In the 62nd amendment, the phrase"entire section" seems very clear. An entire section of a bill is
commonly understood as a legislatively numbered portion of a
bill. To term anything less than a legislatively numbered sec-
tion an "entire section" strains reason and renders the change
wrought by the 62nd amendment meaningless.
In the face of clear language in the 62nd amendment and
informative legislative history, 3 the court in Fain chose to
construe "entire section" just as it had construed "section"
79. Id. at 689, 619 P.2d at 356.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
82. State ex. rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wash. 2d 575, 183 P.2d 813 (1947).
83. The legislative history of the joint resolution that became the 62nd
amendment supports the notion that the new section veto power was to be restricted
to legislatively-designated sections. In particular, the following points of inquiry are
instructive:
Senator Dore: "Now the second question is in reference to page 2, which
reads on line 6, PROVIDED, That he may not object to less than an entire
section, except that if the section contain one or more appropriation items he
may object to any such appropriation item or items.' Now presumably you are
referring to an appropriation bill, but my question is, assuming you do not
have an appropriation bill but a plain bill which alludes to appropriation,
either in terms of dollars or merely that it shall provide for an appropriation.
Now that is an exception. Is it your intent then in that case that he should
veto parts of the section? That is the way it reads to me."
Senator Grant: "Senator Dore, it is the intent, I believe, that he be restricted
in the use of his item veto, that is to a veto of less than a section, primarily to
appropriations bills."
1974 Senate Journal, 43rd Leg., 3rd Ex. Sess., at 90.
Senator Grant: ". . . It is intended by this measure to return the veto power
to its status as of about 1959. That is the governor, of course, can veto an
entire bill.... If an enactment is so structured in sections, he can veto entire
sections of bills. The question now is the item veto and how that affects it.
There would no longer be an item veto under this constitutional amendment,
with the exception of appropriations amounts, that is less than a section....
[H]e cannot under this constitutional amendment, according to our caucus
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since 1934, ostensibly to avoid the clever draftsmanship that
the court in Cascade feared would result if the legislature's
numbered sections were considered sections under article III,
section 12.84 In fact, Fain presented just the situation the
court was trying to avoid. The court stated that the legislature
used a bill consisting of a single sentence in order to avoid the
veto of the election provision, which had been successfully
vetoed as a separately numbered section.in Hallin.5 Accord-
ing to the court, the one-sentence bill embraced several sub-
jects, only one of which was the election provision.8 6
Under the facts of Fain, the legislature was not abusing its
legislative powers, but using them in a manner that would
force the governor to veto the entire section (which also hap-
pened to be the entire bill) or not veto the section at all. Forc-
ing the governor to make this choice is exactly what article III,
section 12 contemplates. This was a legitimate use by the legis-
lature of its own powers to draft bills, with which the court
should have been loathe to interfere.
By returning to the Cascade separate subject matter test in
Fain, the court greatly softened the effect of the new restric-
tions on the partial veto power. As a result, the balance of leg-
islative power laid out in the 62nd amendment between the
legislative and executive branches was subtly shifted back in
the direction of the governor.
Just as it abandoned the affirmative-negative test, the
court should abandon the separate subject matter test for a
section. Both tests have been relied on when the court has
apparently not been comfortable with the constitutional alloca-
tion of powers, and the application of either test shifts the con-
stitutional balance of legislative power. Moreover, the separate
attorney, veto any less than a section; that is, language that is less than a sec-
tion, except for the appropriation itself."
Senator (Harry) Lewis: "Senator Grant, a further question. In the event an
appropriation bill had a proviso in it which proviso would be less than a full
section, would you clarify the intent of this constitutional amendment as to
the right of the governor to veto that proviso or an amount within the proviso
or an amount indicated as part of the proviso?"
Senator Grant: "It is my understanding and it is our intent, the intent of the
sponsors of this measure, that he could not veto less than an entire section, a
proviso that was less than an entire section, except for the appropriations
amount."
1974 Senate Journal, 43rd Leg., 3rd Ex. Sess., at 116.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 688, 619 P.2d at 356.
86. Id.
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subject matter test is just as flawed in practical terms as the
affirmative-negative test. It is equally difficult to apply and is
no more predictable, as an example from current litigation will
show.
3. Application of the Separate Subject Test
In Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Association v.
State," Judge Richard Strophy of the Thurston County Supe-
rior Court recently attempted to apply the separate subject test
to twenty-four challenged section vetoes to the Motorcycle
Dealers' Franchise Act of 1985.88 The Act contained fifteen
numbered sections. Governor Gardner vetoed numbered sec-
tions and portions of numbered sections, including subsections
and even parts of sentences.
Of the twenty-four challenged partial vetoes, Judge
Strophy found seventeen to be valid section vetoes under the
separate subject test and seven to be invalid vetoes of less than
a section. In his Memorandum Opinion he commented:
This task has been, frankly, extremely difficult, because of
the degree of subjectivity inherent in each determination of
what constitutes a separate subject and, thus, an "entire sec-
tion." The Court is sympathetic to the argument... that the"separate subject" test lends itself to line-drawing of a type
that renders predictability difficult.8 9
The difficulty of Judge Strophy's task can be illustrated with
two examples from the case.
The Motorcycle Dealers' Franchise Act was designed to
regulate relations between motorcycle dealers and motorcycle
manufacturers. Section 3 contains all the Act's definitions.
The governor vetoed the following italicized language in sec-
tion 3(2):
(2) "Designated family member" means (a) an heir as
defined in RCW 11.02.005(6) if the motorcycle dealer dies
intestate or (b) a legatee or devisee as used in Title 11 RCW
if the deceased motorcycle dealer leaves a will. A motorcycle
dealer also may name in a notarized statement any person
as the designated family member for the purposes of receiv-
ing an interest in the motorcycle dealership. Title 11 RCW
applies to this chapter. However, in cases of conflict, the
87. No. 85-2-01488-7 (Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1987).
88. 1985 WASH. LAws ch. 472.
89. Motorcycle Dealers, No. 85-2-01488-7, Mem. Op. at 23.
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notarized inter vivos designation prevails over testamentary
and intestate succession. Notarized inter vivos designations
under this subsection are not codicils to wills.
Depending on how broadly one defines the term "subject,"9 °
section 3(2) can be viewed as encompassing only the subject of
the classes of persons who could be considered designated fam-
ily members, or as including both the subject of who is a desig-
nated family member and the subject of how a dealership can
be transferred inter vivos. The court followed the latter course
and found the veto of the last three sentences of section 3(2) a
valid veto of an entire section.9 '
In another veto of part of a subsection, the court found the
vetoed portion to be less than an entire section. 92 The gover-
nor vetoed the following italicized language in section 8(1):
The manufacturer, distributor, or franchisor shall compen-
sate the dealer for labor, parts, and other expenses incurred
to comply with the manufacturer, distributor, or franchisor's
warranty agreements, and for work and services performed
in connection with delivery and preparation of motorcycles
received from the manufacturer, distributor, or franchisor.
The compensation shall not be less than the rates reasonably
charged by the dealer for like services and parts to retail
customers.
The plaintiffs argued that the subject matter of section 8(2)
was compensation for dealer work.9 3 Defendants, on the other
hand, argued that the vetoed portion concerned only the rate
of compensation and should have been separately codified.9 4
The court concluded that because the excised language "would
substantially alter the import and effect of the remaining lan-
90. In another context, the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted the word"subject" quite broadly. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19 provides: "No bill shall embracemore than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." See, e.g., Kueckelhanv. Federal Old Line Ins. Co, 69 Wash. 2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443, 451 (1966) ("[T]hisconstitutional requirement is to be liberally construed so as not to impose awkwardand hampering restrictions on the legislature .... Consequently, the legislature isdeemed the judge of the scope which it will give the word 'subject.' "); State v.Huntley, 99 Wash. 2d 27, 29, 658 P.2d 1246, 1247 (1983)(only need a "rational unity"between the general subject and the various subsections to meet the requirement of
article II, § 19).
91. Motorcycle Dealers, No. 85-2-01488-7, Mem. Op. at 9.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id Plaintiff was the Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n. Plaintiff-intervenor was the Washington State Legislature.
94. Id. Defendants were the State of Washington, Booth Gardner as Governor,
and the Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc.
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guage, ' '95 the provision was not a separate subject so as to be
considered an entire section. Therefore, the veto was invalid.
To analyze the partial vetoes in both sections 3(2) and 8(1)
under the separate subject test, the court felt compelled to a)
determine the basic thrust of the whole subsection; b) deter-
mine the basic thrust of each sentence in the subsection; c)
determine whether the basic thrust of the subsection would be
substantially altered by taking out the vetoed portion; and d)
determine whether the vetoed portion was sufficiently
independent to stand alone as its own separate subject. This
was a difficult task indeed.
For a court to go through this tedious exercise every time
the governor puts a pen to parts of a bill is detrimental to the
legislative process. First, the test is too subjective and may
allow the court to make decisions based on its own view of the
policy. Second, the separate subject test creates uncertainty.
The governor may be unsure what parts can be vetoed, the leg-
islature may be unsure how to arrange bills, and neither the
executive nor legislative branches would be sure of the final
contents of the bill until after the court had made a final judg-
ment on the validity of the partial vetoes. All this uncertainty
leads to an inefficient legislative process.
The 62nd amendment does not necessitate this ineffi-
ciency. At its next opportunity, the Washington Supreme
Court should reconsider the appropriateness and necessity of
continuing to use the separate subject test to determine the
validity of section vetoes.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Changes are needed to reduce uncertainties in the current
legislative process. The best solution is to reduce judicial
involvement to the minimum required by the Constitution.
This can be accomplished either by abandoning the separate
subject test or by amending article III, section 12 once more. A
less desirable remedy, because it only treats the symptoms and
not the cause, is to rely on the legislature to override any par-
tial veto it believes is either politically unacceptable or consti-
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A. Abandon the Separate Subject Test
If Motorcycle Dealers reaches the Washington Supreme
Court, the court will have no better opportunity to consider
abandoning the separate subject test. Governor Gardner's par-tial vetoes to the Motorcycle Dealers' Franchise Act present
twenty-four examples of what a separate subject may or may
not be. The court is likely to experience frustration trying to
discern whether any portion of a numbered section is "sepa-
rate" or "independent" from the rest of the section.
Beyond examining the practical problems associated with
the separate subject test, the court should take a hard look at
the power-shifting effect the separate subject test has in the
legislative process. The test allows the governor more partial
veto power than the words "entire section" reasonably imply.
For the court to allow the governor this extra power is just as
much of an "intrusion into the legislative branch"9 as the use
of the affirmative-negative test was.
The court should not assume that the legislature will place
numerous items into every numbered section of a bill that
otherwise could have been placed in a separately numbered
section. The legislature has a practical interest in drafting bills
logically and understandably. Its interests are not merely
political.
It is time for the court to acknowledge that the words"entire section" probably mean just what they seem to say.
The governor's choices will be more difficult, but no great
catastrophe is likely to result, and the legislative process will
be more certain and efficient.
B. Amend the Constitution
If the court continues to hold that the words "entire sec-
tion" refer to separate, independent subject matter rather than
to a legislatively designated section, then article III, section 12
should be amended once more. The language needs to be made
perfectly clear. One possibility would be to add the following
bracketed phrase:
Provided, That he may not object to less than an entire sec-
tion [,as designated by the Legislature,] except that if thesection contain one or more appropriation items he mayobject to any such appropriation item or items.
96. Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 546, 682 P.2d at 874.
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Such an amendment would eliminate subjective judicial
determinations of what a "section" is. Judicial review of sec-
tion vetoes would not, however, be entirely precluded. The
governor's partial veto powers would still be subject to
implicit restraints. For instance, one would expect that the
governor could not veto a provision in a bill that prevents the
remainder from operating as law, unless the governor vetoed
the whole bill. In other words, the remaining provisions must
constitute a complete and workable law.97
By minimizing the need for judicial determinations of
what constitutes a valid section veto, a new constitutional
amendment would speed up and smooth out the legislative pro-
cess. The legislature would draft bills according to both policy
and common sense. The governor would veto any numbered
section containing politically or legally unacceptable material.
Then the legislature would have to attempt to override any
partial veto it found politically unacceptable.98 At this point,
the process would end.
Judicial abandonment of the separate subject test and
amendment of article III, section 12 are equally effective reme-
dies for correcting the problems in the legislative process gen-
erated by the section veto power. Less effective and less
appropriate is heavy reliance on the legislature to override
every partial veto to which it objects.
C. Increase Legislative Overrides
One of the changes worked by the 62nd amendment to the
former veto powers under article III, section 12 was the addi-
tion of a post-adjournment legislative override provision. 9 The
legislature's ability to override a governor's veto has always
been a most important check on a governor's veto powers. The
Washington Supreme Court has emphasized on several occa-
sions the need for the legislature to override vetoes, rather
than to rely on the courts to declare exercises of the veto
power invalid.100
One way to measure a governor's influence is to examine
97. See Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 707, 264 N.W.2d 539, 551 (1978) (citing State ex rel.
Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 450, 289 N.W. 662, 665 (1940)).
98. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 16.
100. See Washington Fed'n, 101 Wash. 2d at 547, 682 P.2d at 875; Hallin, 94 Wash.
2d at 678, 619 P.2d at 360.
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the frequency with which vetoes are overridden.10 1 The addi-
tional override power in the 62nd amendment gives the legisla-
ture a greater opportunity to override vetoes. Under the
present constitutional wording, the legislature is not penalized
as heavily as previously for failing to distribute its workload
over the entire session to avoid congestion before
adjournment. 10 2
Although governors with strong veto powers are less
likely to experience overrides than those governors with weak
veto powers, 10 3 overrides are more highly associated with
divided party control of state government than with the
strength of the governor's formal veto powers. 0 4 Thus, the
Washington governor's uniquely broad veto powers should not
alone excuse the legislature from attempting to override both
pre- and post-adjournment vetoes. If Washington Federation
is an indication that the court is unwilling to arbitrate partial
veto disputes, then the Washington legislature would be wise
to exercise its override powers freely, or at least attempt to do
SO.
To hold the legislature responsible for overriding partial
vetoes is a good idea when the scope of the governor's partial
veto powers can be objectively determined by reading the Con-
stitution. On the other hand, to rely on the legislature to over-
ride partial vetoes is inappropriate when the scope of the
partial veto power is obscured by a subjective judicial test such
as the separate subject test. Such reliance forces the legisla-
ture to wear two hats, policymaker and interpreter of the
Constitution. The second role belongs to the court, not the leg-
islature. The legislature should not be asked to override vetoes
of questionable constitutional validity. Although the legislature
holds the hammer, that hammer is a political tool, and should
not be used to determine the scope of the governor's partial
veto powers under the Constitution.
If the Washington Supreme Court continues to use the
separate subject test, the legislature should exercise its over-
ride powers to reduce the uncertainty caused by waiting for a
judicial determination of a veto's validity under the Constitu-
101. Prescott, The Executive Veto in American States, 3 W. POL. Q. 98, 104 (1950).
102. According to Prescott, legislative ineptitude is a controlling factor in the
growth of the governor's powers. Id. at 112.
103. Wiggins, Executive Vetoes And Legislative Overrides In The American States,
42 J. POL. 1110, 1115 (1980).
104. Id. at 1117.
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tion. This is an impractical and inefficient way to remedy the
current problems in the legislative process, but it may be the
only way to check the governor's use of the section veto power
until the court abandons the separate subject test or the voters
amend article III, section 12.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, Washington governors have enjoyed
uniquely broad partial veto powers. Judicial interpretation of
the partial veto powers granted to the governor in article III,
section 12 led to the development of two subjective, unwork-
able tests, the affirmative-negative test, which worked to the
governor's disadvantage, and the separate subject test, which
works to the legislature's disadvantage. Both tests cause
uncertainty and inefficiency in the legislative process. More-
over, in applying these tests, the Washington Supreme Court
inappropriately alters the balance of power between the legis-
lative and executive branches. Although the court should be
applauded for abandoning the affirmative-negative test, it also
needs to reconsider its use of the separate subject section veto
test. The language of article III, section 12 contemplates a leg-
islative process with minimal judicial intervention.
Heidi A. Irvin
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